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Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy, by Jerry L. Walls. New York: Oxford 
Uniwrsity Press, 2002. Pp. 240. $35.00. 
KEVIN KINGHORN, The Queen's College, Oxford 
A decade ago Professor Jerry Walls tackled the neglected topic of hell with 
Hell: The Logic of Damnation (1992, Notre Dame Press). In a second major 
eschatological work, Walls now takes on the perhaps even more neglected 
topic of heaven. In Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy one finds a thoughtful 
elucidation of the Christian view of heaven, as well as reasons why a doc-
trine of heaven is indispensable for any adequate Christian theology. One 
also finds interesting individual discussions of a number of philosophical 
issues, all within a larger exploration of how an orthodox doctrine of heav-
en provides resources for addressing some notoriously difficult philosoph-
ical and existential questions. 
Walls spends much of Chapter One challenging David Hume's conclu-
sion that our world seemingly points to a God who is amoral. Walls points 
to Hume's acknowledgment that God created us with moral sentiments by 
which we naturally approve that which is virtuous and promotes human 
happiness. Walls then argues that a God who gave us such moral senti-
ments, but who did not share these sentiments or care whether they were 
finally frustrated, would not be an amoral God but rather a God with a 
malevolent moral character. If our options, then, are between a benevolent 
God and a malevolent God, Walls maintains that evidential considerations 
and, especially, practical considerations make it clear that "the only kind of 
God it is reasonable to believe in is a perfectly good one" (28). And given 
the thesis that a good and supremely powerful God would not create us 
with the kind of aspirations we have and then leave those aspirations 
unsatisfied, the author concludes that the Christian idea of God requires a 
doctrine of heaven. 
Ha ving discussed in Chapter One the connection between heaven and 
God's goodness, Walls proceeds in Chapter Two to discuss the connection 
between heaven and the nature of salvation. Noting that salvation 
involves a process of regeneration so that one is ready for" a heaven of per-
fect love and fellowship with God," Walls asks about those people who 
plead Christ's atonement "but die before they have been thoroughly trans-
formed" (52). The author defends the doctrine of purgatory in response to 
this difficulty, offering two reasons why the necessary transformation 
could not simply occur in an instant after one's earthly life. First, he main-
tains that it may be difficult to make sense of the idea of an instantaneous 
transition of moral character within essentially temporal beings such as 
ourselves. But even if that problem is resolved, Walls argues that such an 
instantaneous transformation will typically be incompatible with the kind 
of moral freedom God has given us. Developing this line of argument, 
Walls contends that the Christian theist has good reason to conclude that 
"God has given us incompatibilist or libertarian freedom and that he takes 
our fr'2edom very seriously" (54). And he argues that the kind of "legiti-
mate persuasion" that respects others' freedom and value "is accomplished 
when the persons involved understand and own the inSight that is 
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offered" (55). While the person who pleads Christ's atonement may have a 
broad desire at the time of her death to be fully transformed, Walls notes 
that "the desire for sanctity may be psychologically compatible with hold-
ing on to any number of sins" (56). For one may not recognize one's more 
subtle sinful attitudes as indeed sinful or recognize the extent of their 
destructive nature. Thus, fully discerning the truth about ourselves and 
allowing that truth to "sink into our character" is a mental process "that 
requires time for finite minds" (58). 
In Chapter Three Walls examines that which distinguishes those who 
attain heavenly life from those who in the end do not. He starts from the 
premise that" a God of perfect love would do everything he could, short of 
overriding freedom, to elicit a positive response from all persons" (67). 
Here Walls appeals to the notion of 'optimal grace' -developed in his ear-
lier work on hell-which involves the idea that all people will have the 
opportunity at some point to make a fully informed and fully decisive 
response to God. From this starting point, the author examines the theo-
logical positions of particularism, pluralism and inclusivism. He rejects 
particularlism on the grounds that a perfectly loving God would not allow 
the contingencies of time, place and historical accident to playa role in 
whether God's relationship with any person is finally developed and per-
fected. Put another way, Walls maintains that it would be morally intoler-
able for one's eternal salvation to hinge on whether in one's earthly life one 
was lucky enough to hear a clear presentation of the gospel message. 
Walls then turns to consider pluralism, as the position is developed by 
John Hick, but concludes that pluralism is incompatible with orthodox 
Christian beliefs and practices and is "altogether unacceptable for anyone 
who takes seriously anything like a traditional view of heaven" (79). In the 
end, Walls defends inclusivism as a way to reconcile an affirmation of opti-
mal grace with the orthodox Christian teaching that salvation is through 
Christ alone. On the inclusivist position-the groundwork for which 
Walls provided in his earlier discussions of purgatory-one's fully 
informed, fully decisive response to God may well happen after one's 
earthly life. Walls acknowledges Hick's objection that inclusivism is an ad 
hoc way of salvaging God's goodness in the face of the empirical fact that 
many parts of our world remain unevangelized and unredeemed. Yet, 
Walls defends inc1usivism as "deeply rooted in the most basic claims of 
Christian theism" (81) and notes that it has had considerable support 
among Christian writers from the early centuries. 
Walls then turns to consider how the doctrine of heaven sheds light on 
various philosophical and theological issues. In Chapter Four he examines 
personal identity. His stated goal in the chapter is not to defend the notion 
of resurrected selves in light of independent philosophical investigations. 
Rather, his aim is to show that "the doctrine of heaven is actually a positive 
resource for dealing with this classically confounding controversy [of per-
sonal identity)" (93). Walls discusses the ways in which Christian affirma-
tions about the survival of the person provide ontological and epistemic 
support for the idea that persons are the locus of persisting consciousness 
and memory. He then considers the question of how to capture "the sub-
stance of what we value in individuals that forms their unique personali-
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ties and makes them the distinctive persons they are" (106). Appealing to 
Colin Gunton's contention that the ontological question of identity cannot 
be separated from a person's relationships with other persons, Walls 
argues that one's identity is constituted by the history of one's relation-
ships-most importantly the relationship with God that develops as one 
responds to God's grace. 
In Chapter Five Walls focuses on "the problem of 'irredeemable evil' " 
(113). Stating his purpose for the chapter, he writes, "1 want to focus on the 
particular case of those horrendous evils that seem beyond repair and to 
show that heaven is our only hope of resolving these and of providing an 
adequate theodicy for those who hold to a rich conception of God's good-
ness" (117). Walls's central contention is that our tme happiness is secure 
as long as our positive relationship with God is maintained. Thus, even 
the horrendous evils that do occur in this life cannot destroy the ultimate 
source of our happiness. Walls acknowledges, and even presses the point, 
that some horrendous evils, such as a tragic death, do seem to sufferers to 
represent "the ripping asunder of relationships that were the very fabric of 
hopes and dreams and thus of a meaningful life" (116). And he urges that 
"The doctrine of heaven, with its resource of eternal transforming grace, 
offers the only realistic way of restructuring our lives and reinterpreting all 
our past histories in such a way that there is a truly hopeful future for any 
of us" (132). 
Walls looks in Chapter Six at the phenomenon of near death experiences 
and explores whether they provide support for the Christian doctrine of 
heaven. He considers the suggestions by various naturalists that such 
experiences are merely visions of a 'dying brain.' However, after survey-
ing the contributions in religious epistemology of Alvin Plantinga and 
William Alston, Walls concludes that "the work of both of these philoso-
phers give us ground to take [near death experiences] as at least prima 
facie evidence for life after death" (160). This chapter marks the one point 
where Walls's stated apologetic aim is sometimes not completely clear, as 
it is not always obvious how we should read 'prima facie' in reference to 
the prima facie evidence stemming from the work of Plantinga and Alston. 
Plantinga's work on warrant and proper basicality seems best read as an 
argwnent that the rationality of religious belief cannot be separated from 
the question of whether God really does exist. On his account, if it is true 
that the Christian God does exist and has indeed designed us in such a 
way that we form true Christian beliefs in certain situations, then it will 
turn out that these beliefs had warrant all along. Perhaps this is prima 
facie evidence for Walls's larger project in the sense that, if it is true that 
God does exist, then it may turn out that near death experiences were good 
evidence for the doctrine of heaven all along. As for Alston's work on per-
ceiving God, Alston has argued that it is prima facie rational to form beliefs 
about God in response to experiences of perceiving him if doing so is a 
"socially established doxastic practice" (149). Of course, both Alston and 
Walls acknowledge that "the prima facie rationality of such beliefs can be 
overridden by other considerations" (149}-most notably by different and 
incompatible religious beliefs formed by others in response to their own 
religious experiences. Thus, one's reasons for preferring a uniquely 
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Christian interpretation of religious experiences may well hinge on consid-
erations such as the historic grounds for thinking the claims of the 
Christian religion more probably true than the claims of other religions. In 
the end, Alston's work seems to be prima facie evidence for Walls's larger 
project in the sense that Christian beliefs arising from religious experi-
ences--of which near death experiences are one kind-may constitute one 
of the mutually reinforcing parts of a cumulative case argument one might 
make for the Christian religion and its doctrine of heaven. 
Walls's final chapter is an examination of morality and the meaning of 
life. He begins his examination by arguing that nahualism has difficulty 
"not only making sense of altruism but also providing us with deeply per-
suasive moral motivation" (162). He notes that Henry Sidgwick and other 
moral philosophers have identified as problematic the relationship 
between morality and self-interest, or between what is good for others and 
what is good for ourselves. Citing Immanuel Kant's acknowledgment that 
"happiness and virtue must correspond if the moral enterprise is to make 
sense," Walls argues that in a naturalistic world "there simply is no over-
riding reason to be moral. At the very least, there is no decisive reason to 
do so when it will require us to sustain a net loss in the goods of this life" 
(165). Yet, Walls contends, if one allows for the Christian idea of heaven, 
then a conflict between altruism and self-interest is simply not a possibility. 
For, on the Christian account of things, "we cannot harm our well-being by 
obedience to God" and to his commands to serve one another in love (192). 
Indeed, it is in the giving of ourselves to God and others "in a relationship 
of mutual love, of reciprocal giving and receiving" that we become partak-
ers in the life of the Trinity, where we receive gifts from God that will 
always be greater then anything we might sacrifice (199). The picture of 
God that emerges from this discussion is an immensely attractive portrait 
of a Being who is deeply personal and profoundly loving. In concluding 
his discussion Walls does not argue that we should accept his picture of 
God and heaven "just because it answers to deeply felt needs." However, 
he does maintain that we should not simply dismiss it out of hand because 
it does so, for in "assessing the Christian vision of reality," one considera-
tion must surely be whether it provides "an adequate account of who we 
are in the depths of our being" (200). 
While this book contains a strong defense of the orthodox Christian 
understanding of heaven, Walls's unabashed defense of purgatory is 
bound to strike many readers-particularly Protestant ones-as theologi-
cally controversial. At the same time, his defense of purgatory contains 
some of his best lines of argument. While acknowledging that the notion 
of purgatory has sometimes been linked with ugly historic disputes such 
as the selling of indulgences, Walls insists that Roman Catholics, adherents 
of Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestants have reason to affirm the doctrine of 
purgatory. Walls begins by referring to Alister McGrath's historic study of 
the doctrine of justification in which McGrath notes that justification was 
understood throughout the medieval period "as the process by which a 
man is made righteous, subsuming the concepts of 'sanctification' and 
'regeneration'." McGrath argues that medieval thinkers were faithful to 
Augustine on this point, whereas "the Reformers departed from it" (40). 
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Walls explains that the Protestant Reformers, or at least some of their fol-
lowers, "departed from the catholic consensus in seeing justification as a 
forensic or legal declaration that the believer is declared righteous, rather 
than a process whereby he is actually made righteous" (40). Against those 
who would wrongly seek to separate sanctification from justification and 
salvation, Walls stresses that salvation "is essentially a matter of loving 
God and being rightly related to him .... There is no question of 'going to' 
heaven if one is not the sort of person who has the sort of desires and affec-
tions for God that heaven satisfies" (40). To support the intrinsic connec-
tion between the perfection of one's moral character and the attainment of 
heaven, Walls discusses various writers' analyses of standard theories of 
the atonement-specifically, penal substitution, moral influence, and sacri-
fice theories. Walls shows that one thing all these accounts have in com-
mon is the necessity of our own moral transformation if heaven is finally to 
be attained. Walls's line of argument here, and his accompanying defense 
against the charge of works righteousness, is compelling. Whether one 
sees his larger argument about the need for purgatory-where moral 
transformation can finally be perfected so that one can take part in the 
heavenly community-as also compelling will depend on whether one 
shares his views about the importance of libertarian freedom and about the 
need for an interval of time if we are freely to own the insights that morally 
tram.form us. At the very least, Walls has provided a plausible line of 
argument for purgatory that cannot easily be dismissed. 
Given that this book touches on so many philosophical and theological 
topic." it is perhaps to be expected that the reader may wish at times that his 
or her own area of specialization had received more in-depth discussion. For 
example, in Walls's discussion of naturalistic explanations of near death expe-
riences, he notes that the fact that proximate natural causes may be involved 
in these experiences does not mean that God could not still be the approxi-
mate cause of them. The neuropsychologist here may wonder what Walls 
would make of the claims of some neuroscientists to have generated religious 
experiences in experimental studies in which the brain patterns of subjects are 
phYSically generated by researchers. To cite another example, in his mscus-
sian of irredeemable evil, Walls maintains that "Christians are encouraged to 
hope that not even evils having deep roots in the pernlanence of the past are 
beyond the resolution of God's amazingly creative grace" (131). In response, 
the moral philosopher may still want to press the question of how redeemed 
persons' knowledge that some of their earthly friends have decisively rejected 
God would not rob them of perfect and everlasting joy. 
Still, Walls is up front about the aims of his various discussions. He 
acknowledges, for example, that his goal is not to provide a systematic 
theodicy or to offer a knock-down argument for life after death from the 
evidence of near death experiences. Instead, he offers the doctrine of heav-
en as a resource for shedding light on a number of topics; and there are 
indeed a number of very interesting discussions within this book. Walls 
maintains philosophical rigor throughout--even in those sections that tend 
toward more popular apologetic subject matter. Professional philosophers 
of religion and serious non-professionals will find Walls's eminently read-
able treatment of heaven both lively and illuminating. 
